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Introduction
After logging onto Facebook, you see that your friend has posted a
video on your wall titled: “Donald Trump Pee Tape Released.”
Surprised, you click on the link and are directed to a YouTube video of
several young, scantily clad Russian women bouncing on a bed in what
appears to be the infamous Presidential Suite at the Ritz Carlton in
Moscow.1 Donald Trump walks into the room and heads towards the
1.

President Obama reportedly stayed in the Presidential Suite of the Ritz
Carlton in Moscow during a diplomatic trip to Russia. Michelle Goldberg,
Lordy, Is There a Tape?, N.Y. Times (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/04/16/opinion/comey-book-steele-dossier.html [https://
perma.cc/FB5T-GGWF]. Later, Donald Trump was alleged to have
stayed in the same room and hired Russian prostitutes to pee on the same
bed where President Obama slept. Id.
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women. You hear Trump’s voice say, “let’s have some fun, ladies.” The
girls laugh and you hear Trump again: “How about we show Obama
what we think of him. Why don’t you pee on his bed?” The tape cuts
off in an instant and you feel shocked. Could this video actually be real?
The video in the hypothetical above could easily be what is
described colloquially as a “deepfake.” The definition of a deepfake is
“still in flux, as technology develops.”2 However, a deepfake is generally
understood to be a video made with the use of machine-learning to swap
one real person’s face onto another real person’s face. This ability
essentially makes it possible to ascribe the conduct of one individual
who has been previously videotaped to a different individual.3 That is,
a deepfake is a digital impersonation of someone. This impersonation
occurs without the consent of either the person in the original video or
the person whose face is superimposed on the original. Individuals in
the public eye have already been a major target for deepfakes.4 Political
figures likely will be the targets of future deepfakes, especially by those
with an interest in spreading discord and undermining public trust.5
Deepfakes of political figures pose serious challenges for our political
system and even national security, but legal remedies for these videos
are complicated. Every legal remedy to combat the negative effects of
political deepfakes must go through a careful balancing test. On one
side you have a special interest in protecting high-value political speech
and furthering public discourse under the First Amendment. On the
other side you have the potential for severe public harm by undermining
elections and eroding trust in public officials. Although some political
deepfakes might be satirical and promote public discourse about the

2.

James Vincent, Why We Need a Better Definition of ‘Deepfake’, The
Verge (May 22, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/
17380306/deepfake-definition-ai-manipulation-fake-news [https://perma.cc/
55JA-SH67].

3.

Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming
Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 Calif. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4–5).

4.

Samantha Cole, AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All Fucked,
Vice: Motherboard (Dec. 11, 2017, 2:18 PM), https://motherboard.vice
.com/en_us/article/gydydm/gal-gadot-fake-ai-porn [https://perma.cc/
4PQW-KCVE].

5.

James Vincent, US Lawmakers Say AI Deepfakes ‘Have the Potential to
Disrupt Every Facet of Our Society’, The Verge (Sept. 14, 2018, 1:17
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/14/17859188/ai-deepfakes-nationalsecurity-threat-lawmakers-letter-intelligence-community [https://perma.cc/
WE3U-BCLN]; Ana Romano, Jordan Peele’s Simulated Obama PSA Is a
Double-Edged Warning Against Fake News, Vox (Apr. 18, 2018, 3:00
PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/18/17252410/jordan-peele-obamadeepfake-buzzfeed [https://perma.cc/3B9H-SX4X].
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merits of an individual candidate or issue,6 many deepfakes will likely
cross over the line into pure defamation.
Given this careful balancing test, what remedies are available for
defamatory political deepfakes that survive First Amendment scrutiny?
If deepfakes are found to be truly defamatory, such speech would only
receive limited First Amendment protection and victims could recoup
monetary damages from successful defamation lawsuits. 7 For most
political figures, however, damages will be difficult, if not impossible,
to determine, and any monetary damages will come too late to truly
remedy the reputational harm inflicted during a campaign or their
tenure as a public figure. Thus, injunctions are likely a quicker and
more effective remedy for defamatory political deepfakes.
Although injunctions against deepfakes may seem like a logical
remedy, they will likely face major First Amendment hurdles. The
Supreme Court has yet to provide a definitive answer on whether
injunctions against defamatory speech are permissible under the First
Amendment. 8 Some lower courts have found injunctions to be
impermissible because they are not sufficiently tailored, effectively
creating a prior restraint on constitutionally protected speech.9 Other
courts have suggested that narrowly crafted injunctions against
defamatory speech may be permissible.10 Even if an injunction against
a defamatory political deepfake survives a First Amendment challenge,
victims might still be unable to remove that deepfake if its creator is
unreachable by United States courts.11
This Note argues that narrowly crafted injunctions against
defamatory political deepfakes should be permitted under the First
6.

See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988) (“Despite
their sometimes caustic nature . . . graphic depictions and satirical cartoons
have played a prominent role in public and political debate.”).

7.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The
freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of
speech, including defamation.”).

8.

See Tony v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005) (discussing but not resolving
the permissibility of an injunction against defamatory speech).

9.

See Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 34 (1st Cir. 2018); McCarthy v.
Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 461–62 (7th Cir. 2015); see also infra Part V.

10.

See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125
F.3d 1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding an injunction against
fraudulent speech); Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir.
1992) (permitting a limited injunction against defamatory speech);
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (permitting a limited
injunction against defamatory speech); David S. Ardia, Freedom of
Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 41 (2013).

11.

Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 44–45.
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Amendment. First, this Note gives an overview of deepfakes and the
technology used to propagate them. Then, it addresses the potential
defamatory and non-defamatory uses of political deepfakes and how
defamatory political deepfakes would be analyzed under the First
Amendment’s heightened scrutiny standard that is used to analyze
political speech. Third, it gives an overview of injunctions on speech
under First Amendment jurisprudence and provides some examples of
permissible injunctions on expression. Fourth, borrowing from obscen–
ity and copyright law, this Note discusses injunctions as a remedy for
defamatory political deepfakes and whether such injunctions should be
considered impermissible prior restraints on speech. Finally, it addresses
the issue of unreachable defendants and provides a potential solution
by extending to deepfakes the requirements for copyrighted materials
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.12

I.

What Are Deepfakes?

The notion of what a deepfake is might seem intuitive at first
glance—deepfakes seem to be a simple fake or face-swapping video. But
such a simple definition grossly oversimplifies the technology behind
deepfakes and lacks the specificity needed to properly address deepfakes
from a legal perspective.
A.

The Technology Behind Deepfakes

Traditionally, any individual who wanted to edit a photo or video
would have to upload the photo or video into a computer program and
manually make any desired edits. Computer programs have gradually
made the editing process easier, but a complete manual overhaul of a
video with realistic final results is still very time- and resourceintensive.13 For instance, when the creators of Rogue One: A Star Wars
Story decided to bring back the character of Grand Moff Tarkin through
a digital recreation, the Rogue One visual-effects supervisor described
the digital recreation process as “extremely labor-intensive and
expensive.”14

12.

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).

13.

Donie O’Sullivan, Deepfake Videos: Inside the Pentagon’s Race Against
Disinformation, CNN (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/
2019/01/business/pentagons-race-against-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/
PQ2H-PK59]; Scott Ross, Why VFX House Lose Money on Big Movies,
The Hollywood Reporter (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/news/why-life-pi-titanic-vfx-426182 [https://perma
.cc/Z8KF-X2HZ].

14.

Grand Moff Tarkin was originally played by the late Peter Cushing but
Cushing died prior to the filming of Rogue One: A Star Wars Story. Dave
Itzkoff, How ‘Rogue One’ Brought Back Familiar Faces, N.Y. Times
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Deepfakes, however, do not require human labor to manually
manipulate videos; instead, a computer’s processing power does all the
work.15 The technology that makes deepfakes possible stems from “a
branch of Machine Learning that focuses on deep neural networks”
called “deep learning.” 16 Deep learning loosely imitates the way the
brain works by processing information through a series of nodes (similar
to neurons) in an artificial neural network. For a neural network to
replicate an image, it must take in a multitude of information from a
particular source (often called an “input layer”) and then run that
information through various nodes until it produces an “output layer.”17
Neural networks are “trained” by adjusting the weights at each node
to try to improve the final “output layer” to be as close as possible to
the desired result.18
Deepfakes add an extra layer of complexity onto this process
because they ultimately have two input sources: (1) the face in the
original scenario video (“original face”), and (2) the face swapped into
the original scenario video (“swapped face”). To facilitate this process,
a computer must generate two separate neural networks for each image,
each that has enough in common with the other to be able to swap
images on a shared facial structure.19 A basic way to achieve this result
is through an autoencoder.20 An autoencoder is a “neural network that
is trained to attempt to copy its input to its output.”21 In order for the
face swapping to be successful, the computer must construct two
separate neural networks, one for the original face and another for the
swapped face, and both must be trained separately. 22 Once the
individual networks have been built with enough accuracy through
training, then a portion of the networks called the decoders can be
swapped, effectively pasting the swapped face onto the network of the
(Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/movies/how-rogueone-brought-back-grand-moff-tarkin.html [https://perma.cc/F9B7-8K62].
15.

O’Sullivan, supra note 13.

16.

Alan Zucconi, An Introduction to Neural Networks and Autoencoders,
Alan Zucconi Blog (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.alanzucconi.com/2018/
03/14/an-introduction-to-autoencoders/ [https://perma.cc/HJ6F-MJXS].

17.

Id. (explaining that image-based applications are often built on
convolutional neural networks).

18.

Id.

19.

Alan Zucconi, Understanding the Technology Behind DeepFakes, Alan
Zucconi Blog (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.alanzucconi.com/2018/
03/14/understanding-the-technology-behind-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/
L7UE-2WWF].

20.

Zucconi, supra note 16.

21.

Ian Goodfellow et al., Deep Learning 499 (2016) (ebook).

22.

Zucconi, supra note 19.
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original face. Using such technology allows the swapped face to mimic
any expressions originally made by the original face in the original
video.23

24

Face generation can be made even more realistic through the use of
a Generative Adversarial Network (“GAN”).25 Similar to autoencoding,
GANs attempt to recreate images using deep-learning techniques. 26
GANs achieve this result by using two components: (1) a generator,
which creates natural looking images, and (2) a discriminator, which
decides whether the images are real or fake.27 Essentially the “generator
tries to fool the discriminator by generating real images as far as
possible.”28 Through this adversarial process between the generator and
discriminator, the network is able to produce more consistently realistic
images than it could through a traditional autoencoding structure.
Most recently, mathematicians and computer scientists have
attempted to combine GANs with a specialized type of autoencoding
called “variational autoencoding” (collectively, “VAE-GANs”) to

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 6; see also Ian Goodfellow et al.,
Generative Adversarial Nets, arXiv (June 10, 2014), https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1406.2661.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2HH-PL2M].

26.

Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 7.

27.

Prakash Pandey, Deep Generative Models, Medium (Jan. 23, 2018), https://
medium.com/@prakashpandey9/deep-generative-models-e0f149995b7c
[https://perma.cc/5NXU-MHC8].

28.

Id.
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produce the most realistic output layers or generated images to date.29
VAE-GANs work by using the autoencoding process to provide an
image to the GAN’s generator.30 The GAN’s discriminator then checks
the image through an iterative process to make it seem more realistic.31
In addition to the advancements in deepfake videos, researchers have
also made strides in improving fake audio through GANs32 and other
techniques.33 These advancements are only the beginning of computerimage and audio regeneration. Deepfake creators report that the
technology behind deepfakes “is improving rapidly,” and the creators
“see no limit to whom they can impersonate.”34
B.

How Deepfakes Got Their Name

Although the technology (and mathematics) behind deepfakes is
complex, using deepfake technology is relatively simple. 35 This is
especially true after an anonymous user on reddit named “deepfake”
posted computer code on a subreddit forum in late 2017 that allowed
hobbyists to create deepfakes. 36 In early 2018, another reddit user
29.

Enoch Kan, What The Heck Are VAE-GANs?, Towards Data Science
(Aug. 16, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/what-the-heck-are-vaegans-17b86023588a [https://perma.cc/D9J8-NURV].

30.

Anders Larsen et al., Autoencoding Beyond Pixels Using a Learned Similarity
Metric, ArXiv (Feb. 10, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.09300.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XK4U-AQ3C].

31.

Id.; Kan, supra note 29.

32.

See generally Chris Donahue et al., Adversarial Audio Synthesis, ArXiv
(Feb.
12,
2018),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.04208.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UQ3J-892W]; Yang Gao et al., Voice Impersonation
Using Generative Adversarial Networks, ArXiv (Feb. 19, 2018),
http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06840.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ6K-9LC8].

33.

Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 7; O’Sullivan, supra note 13.

34.

Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos Are Being Weaponized to Harass and
Humiliate Women: ‘Everybody Is a Potential Target’, Wash. Post (Dec.
30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/30/fakeporn-videos-are-being-weaponized-harass-humiliate-women-everybody-ispotential-target/?utm_term=.8693f1f740f5 [https://perma.cc/7TDN-662W].

35.

Alan Zucconi, How to Install FakeApp, Alan Zucconi Blog (Mar. 14,
2018), https://www.alanzucconi.com/2018/03/14/how-to-install-fakeapp/
[https://perma.cc/T3G4-PEMB].

36.

Jeevan Biswas, What Exactly Is Deepfakes and Why Is This AI-Based
Creation a Menace, Analytics India Mag. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://
www.analyticsindiamag.com/deepfakes-ai-celebrity-fake-videos/ [https://
perma.cc/K6E6-NJMA]. The actual month that the subreddit was created
is contested by various Internet sources. Compare id. (claiming the
“deepfakes” subreddit was created in November 2017), with Aja Romano,
Why Reddit’s Face-Swapping Celebrity Porn Craze is a Harbinger of
Dystopia, Vox (Feb. 7, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/1/31/
16932264/reddit-celebrity-porn-face-swapping-dystopia [https://perma.cc/
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adapted that code into a user-friendly application called FakeApp.37
Users of the original code and FakeApp did not need to understand the
complex mathematical and computational underpinnings of deepfake
technology. Instead, users merely needed above average computer
literacy and a sufficiently powerful Graphics Processing Unit (“GPU”)
in their computer to create deepfakes.38
News of the user-friendly application spread quickly, and users
began posting their own computer-generated face-swapping videos on
the “deepfake” subreddit.39 User and commentators began to call the
videos “deepfakes” after the subreddit where they were born.40 Many
users used the technology to perverse ends, often swapping celebrities’
faces (primarily female) onto pornographic videos. 41 Users also
generated “revenge porn” deepfakes by swapping their ex-girlfriends’
faces onto pornographic videos. 42 Not all users made pornographic
deepfakes. Many users enjoyed splicing Nicholas Cage’s face onto
various movie and television characters.43 Over 80,000 people partic–
ipated in the subreddit before it was eventually shut down due to the
XP3Q-UDN7] (claiming the “deepfakes” subreddit was created in September
2017).
37.

Biswas, supra note 36.

38.

Zucconi, supra note 35.

39.

Damon Beres & Marcus Gilmer, A Guide to ‘Deepfakes,’ the Internet’s
Latest Moral Crisis, Mashable (Feb. 2, 2018), https://mashable.com/
2018/02/02/what-are-deepfakes/#xUHFJsuHqqV [https://perma.cc/
NLP6-FBGF].

40.

Julia Pimentel, Twitter and Reddit Have Banned ‘Deepfake’ Celebrity
Porn Videos, Complex (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.complex.com/life/2018/
02/twitter-reddit-and-more-ban-deepfake-celebrity-videos [https://perma
.cc/K5TL-GHF9].

41.

Cole, supra note 4; Alex Hern, AI Used to Face-Swap Hollywood Stars
into Pornography Films, The Guardian (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www
.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/25/ai-face-swap-pornography-emmawatson-scarlett-johansson-taylor-swift-daisy-ridley-sophie-turner-maisiewilliams [https://perma.cc/3VDX-A5ZB].

42.

Larry N. Zimmerman, Cheap and Easily Manipulated Video, 87 J. Kan.
B. Ass’n, no. 4, Apr. 2014, at 20, https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ksbar.org/
resource/dynamic/blogs/20180410_111450_30470.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9938-ADYD].

43.

Reid McCarter, Idiots on the Internet Are Getting Really Good at Splicing
Nic Cage’s Face Onto Every Movie, AV Club (Sept. 4, 2018, 10:30 AM),
https://news.avclub.com/idiots-on-the-internet-are-getting-really-goodat-splic-1828799192 [https://perma.cc/RP9Z-QFFZ]; Sam Haysom,
Nicolas Cage is Being Added to Random Movies Using Face-Swapping
Technology, Mashable (Jan. 31, 2018), https://mashable.com/2018/01/
31/nicolas-cage-face-swapping-deepfakes/#WGhEd3yKgiqw [https://perma
.cc/SQQ3-D9M8].
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largely nonconsensual pornographic nature of the posted content. 44
Other major platforms such as Twitter, PornHub, Gyfcat, and Discord
have also banned pornographic deepfakes.45 As of this writing, however,
FakeApp is still available online.46
Although many commentators have described the ease of creating
deepfakes, it should be noted that downloading and using FakeApp is
probably still too cumbersome for the average computer user. First, to
“train” a neural network in a reasonable amount of time, a computer
needs an adequately sophisticated GPU.47 As of 2019, a typical laptop
does not have the appropriate GPU to perform deep learning and
generate deepfakes.48 In addition, although there are many tutorials on
how to download and use FakeApp, 49 the process requires above44.

Beres & Gilmer, supra note 39. Later the subreddit was removed. Alex
Hern, Reddit Bans ‘Deepfakes’ Face-Swap Porn Community, The
Guardian (Feb. 8, 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/
feb/08/reddit-bans-deepfakes-face-swap-porn-community [https://perma.cc/
9T4L-YCDV].

45.

Megan Farokhmanesh, Deepfakes Are Disappearing from Parts of the
Web, But They’re Not Going Away, The Verge (Feb. 9, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/9/16986602/deepfakes-bannedreddit-ai-faceswap-porn [https://perma.cc/C4E5-D2PH].

46.

FakeApp Download, https://www.malavida.com/en/soft/fakeapp/#gref
[https://perma.cc/P87C-SEGP] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).

47.

Zucconi, supra note 35; Slav Ivanov, Picking a GPU for Deep Learning,
Slav Ivanov Blog (Nov. 22, 2017), https://blog.slavv.com/picking-agpu-for-deep-learning-3d4795c273b9 [https://perma.cc/UZZ5-SX66].

48.

See Nicholas Deleon, Why Even Non-Gamers May Want a Powerful
Graphics Card in Their Next Computer, Consumer Reports (Aug. 29,
2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/computers/why-even-non-gamersmay-want-a-powerful-graphics-card/ [https://perma.cc/JVS7-7DA3]
(indicating that consumers need to elect to upgrade their laptops to include
GPUs at the time of purchase); Janakiram MSV, In the Era of Artificial
Intelligence, GPUs Are the New CPUs, Forbes (Aug. 7, 2017, 10:14AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janakirammsv/2017/08/07/in-the-era-ofartificial-intelligence-gpus-are-the-new-cpus/#6e5d76755d16 [https://perma
.cc/TU2T-J49H] (noting that for the average consumer GPUs were purely
optional); Zucconi, supra note 35 (stating the training the neural network
without a GPU would take weeks instead of hours).

49.

See generally Zucconi, supra note 35; tech 4tress, Deepfakes Guide: Fake
App 2 2 Tutorial. Installation (Totally Simplified, Model Folder Included),
YouTube (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lsv38PkLsGU&
t=83s [https://perma.cc/FVL3-23WU]; Irrelevant Voice, Deepfakes
Tutorial (FakeApp) (Fake Adult Videos of Celebrities), YouTube (Jan.
28, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghTb2kZSpZE [https://
perma.cc/YV6C-5PGQ]; Oliver Lardner, Tutorial for Mac: Deepfakes—
Reddit [MIRROR], Medium (Feb. 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@
oliverlardner/tutorial-for-mac-deepfakes-reddit-mirror-d75eb8069a16 [https://
perma.cc/ER5V-T9PW].
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average computer literacy, including understanding torrenting, path
configuration, file structures, and application versioning.50 Although the
GPU and technological skills necessary to create deepfakes may be
hurdles for the average computer user, they are far less cumbersome for
an avid computer-hobbyist or gamer. As of 2018, individuals could buy
GPUs sufficient to create deepfakes for as low as $160. 51 Although
regular laptops may be inadequate for creating deepfakes, gaming
laptops regularly feature sufficiently powerful GPUs.52 As developers
create more user-friendly deepfake applications, average computer users
will likely gain greater deepfake-creating capabilities. But even if the
process of creating deepfakes becomes easier, it will likely always
involve deliberate affirmative actions on behalf of the creator (such as
selecting which faces or scenarios to swap).
C.

Defining Deepfakes

As noted above, the technology driving deepfakes and computergenerated images is still rapidly evolving. Thus, defining deepfakes is
especially tricky and researchers are still struggling with a uniform
definition. 53 Legal scholars Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron
describe deepfake technology as “leverag[ing] machine-learning algor–
ithms to insert faces and voices into video and audio recordings of
actual people and enabl[ing] the creation of realistic impersonations out
of digital whole cloth.” 54 Building on this definition, legal scholar
Richard Hasen defined deepfakes as “audio and video clips manipulated
using machine learning and artificial intelligence that can make a
politician, celebrity, or anyone else appear to say or do anything the
manipulator wants.”55 Artificial intelligence researcher Miles Brundage
noted that the term “deepfake” generally refers to a “subset of fake
video that leverages deep learning . . . to make the faking process
easier.” 56 Technologist Aviv Ovadya said that deepfakes can be
50.

Zucconi, supra note 35.

51.

Ivanov, supra note 47.

52.

Gordon Mah Ung & Alaina Yee, How to Pick the Best Gaming Laptop
GPU, PCWorld (Sept. 5, 2018, 4:53 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/
article/3237991/laptop-computers/how-to-pick-the-best-gaming-laptopgpu.html [https://perma.cc/ES33-UZX2].

53.

Vincent, supra note 2.

54.

Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 4.

55.

Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American
Election Law in a Post-Truth World, St. Louis U. L. J., 9 (forthcoming
2020). This Note quotes and cites this article with Professor Hasen’s
permission.

56.

Vincent, supra note 2; Miles Brundage et. al., The Malicious Use of
Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation, Future
of Human. Inst. (Feb. 2018), https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/
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described as “audio or video fabrication or manipulation that would
have been extremely difficult and expensive without AI advances.”57
All of these definitions include the method of creation (by deep
learning or artificial intelligence) as a key way to distinguish deepfakes
from other faked videos. This distinction is very important because the
use of deep learning in a video’s creation implies that such a video can
be created more easily than a manually manipulated video. In addition,
as the technology improves, videos created by deep learning have the
potential to look more realistic than manually altered videos. Another
important element of deepfake videos is the “faking” of a face or a
scenario in a pre-existing video or image. Although to date most
deepfakes have primarily focused on face-swapping and voice alter–
ations, the technology could be used to swap out other components in
a video, such as background or objects in a video. A final definition
must be flexible enough to incorporate any “faking” of an original video
possible by deep learning technology. Combining all the key elements
above, we can use this simplified definition: Deepfakes are videos,
images, and audio created using deep learning to alter the content of
an original video, image, and/or audio file by face-swapping or scenario
alterations.

II. Deepfakes of Political Figures
As we have seen in Part I, deepfakes have a wide range of uses and
raise many legal issues. This Note focuses solely on the impact of
deepfakes targeting political figures, or “political deepfakes.” Through–
out history, individuals have been inclined to use the latest
communications technology to mock, comment about, and criticize
politicians.58 Persons in power have been suspicious of such technology,
often banning or severely restricting its dissemination, usually at the
expense of growth and the exchange of ideas.59 For instance, upon the
invention of the printing press in 1456, French King Charles VII sent a
spy to Mainz to investigate how the device might be used to spread
political ideas. 60 Charles was concerned that the technology could
disseminate information very quickly; he was relieved once he learned
that government leaders placed strict controls on what information
3d82daa4-97fe-4096-9c6b-376b92c619de/downloads/1c6q2kc4v_50335.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZRA2-69RE].
57.

Vincent, supra note 2.

58.

Craig Smith et al., The First Amendment—Its Current Condition, in The
First Amendment—The Challenge of New Technology 9–12 (Sig
Mickelson & Elena Mier Y. Teran eds., 1989).

59.

Id.

60.

Id. at 9–10.
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could be published.61 History teaches us that if we choose to attempt to
mitigate the risks of a new communication technology, such restrictions
should be as limited as possible so as not to curtail the benefits of that
technology.
From the printing press to the Internet, deepfakes are simply the
next in a long line of disruptive communications technology that can
be used to further civic discourse, or misused to deceive and undermine
public trust. Individuals have already used deepfakes to further public
discussion. Jordan Peele created a political deepfake of President
Obama to warn the public of the dangers of political deepfakes in April
of 2018.62 Many political deepfakes, such as Jordan Peele’s, will likely
be viewed by courts as “speech on public issues,” which deserves a place
on the “‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values’ and
is entitled to special protection.”63 Given the possible beneficial uses of
deepfakes by satirists, educators, and artists, an outright ban on
deepfake technology is not only ill-advised but also likely uncon–
stitutional.
However, because deepfakes use deep learning to reduce the effort
needed to “fake” a previously made video, bad actors will have a special
incentive to use this technology not only to mock, but potentially to
frame, undermine, or blackmail political figures. Chesney and Citron
outlined eight potential harms to society resulting from the use of
deepfakes: (1) distortion of democratic discourse, (2) manipulation of
elections, (3) eroding trust in institutions, (4) exacerbating social
divisions, (5) undermining public safety, (6) undermining diplomacy,
(7) jeopardizing national security, and (8) undermining journalism.64
Political deepfakes are the most likely candidates to perpetrate almost
all of the harms outlined by Chesney and Citron. For instance, if a
political deepfake depicting a candidate taking a bribe gets released on
the eve of an election, such a tape could simultaneously change the
election results, distort discourse about the candidates, and erode trust
in public figures and institutions. If the tape agitates activist groups
enough that they begin to hold public protests or demonstrations, such
demonstrations could turn violent and undermine public safety. If a
news outlet runs the story believing it is real and only later finds out it
is fake, the deepfake could also undermine the public’s faith in
61.

Id.

62.

David Mack, This PSA About Fake News from Barack Obama Is Not What
it Appears, BuzzFeed News (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews
.com/article/davidmack/obama-fake-news-jordan-peele-psa-video-buzzfeed#
.el7Eqkeo7A [https://perma.cc/PDW2-DQSV].

63.

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).

64.

Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 20–28.
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journalism. Although this doomsday scenario may seem extreme,
deepfakes that manifest even one of these threats to society could still
cause severe harm.
The deepfake threat has not gone unnoticed by Congress. In July
2018, Senator Marco Rubio mused on a potential danger of deepfakes
as “the ability to influence the outcome [of an election] by putting out
a video of a candidate on the eve before the election doing or saying
something strategically placed, strategically altered, in such a way to
drive some narrative that could flip enough votes in the right place to
cost someone an election.” 65 Senator Rubio characterized such a
situation as “not a threat to our elections, but a threat to our Repub–
lic.”66 Senator Mark Warner also specifically addressed deepfakes in his
draft white paper outlining various policy proposals to regulate social
media and large technology firms. 67 On September 13, 2018,
Representatives Adam Schiff, Stephanie Murphy, and Carlos Curbelo
sent a letter to Director of National Intelligence Dan Coates specifically
asking the intelligence community to “report to Congress and the public
about the implications of new technologies that allow malicious actors
to fabricate audio, video, and still images.”68
Some legislators have even gone so far as to introduce specific
legislation to address deepfakes.69 On December 21, 2018, Senator Sasse
introduced a bill attempting to criminalize the “malicious creation and
distribution of deepfakes” entitled the “Malicious Deep Fake
Prohibition Act of 2018.”70 The bill makes it a crime punishable by up
to ten years imprisonment to:
65.

Senator Marco Rubio, Keynote Remarks at The Heritage Foundation’s
Homeland Security Event on Deep Fakes (July 19, 2018), video available
at Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National
Security, The Heritage Foundation, at 15:00–15:21, https://www.
heritage.org/homeland-security/event/deep-fakes-looming-challenge-privacydemocracy-and-national-security [https://perma.cc/G97A-HK5J].

66.

Id.

67.

Senator Mark R. Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of
Social Media and Technology Firms 2 (Aug. 20, 2018) (White Paper
Draft), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/
2018/08/ftc-2018-0048-d-0104-155263.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y5F-DUQP].

68.

Letter from Adam B. Schiff, Stephanie Murphy, and Carlos Curbelo,
Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, to Daniel R. Coats, Dir.,
Office of Nat’l Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2018), https://schiff.house.gov/imo/
media/doc/2018-09%20ODNI%20Deep%20Fakes%20letter.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D82S-TPQV].

69.

Kaveh Waddell, Lawmakers Plunge into “Deepfake” War, Axios (Jan.
31, 2019), https://www.axios.com/deepfake-laws-fb5de200-1bfe-4aaf-9c9319c0ba16d744.html [https://perma.cc/JCP3-9HDF].

70.

Id.; S. 3805, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). The bill defines “deep fake” as “an
audiovisual record created or altered in a manner that the record would
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(1) create, with the intent to distribute, a deep fake with the
intent that the distribution of the deep fake would facilitate
criminal or tortious conduct under Federal, State, local, or Tribal
law; or
(2) distribute an audiovisual record with –
(A) actual knowledge that the audiovisual record is a deepfake;
and
(B) the intent that the distribution of the audiovisual record
would facilitate criminal or tortious conduct under Federal, State,
local or Tribal law.71

The bill includes the limitation that “any activity protected by the
First Amendment” is not punishable under the Act.72 Although the bill
expired at the end of 2018, Sasse’s office indicated that it intends to
reintroduce the bill.73 Representative Clarke of New York introduced a
bill entitled the “DEEP FAKES Accountability Act in June of 2019.”74
This bill requires deepfake creators to include either a watermark or
disclosure that the audio or video is altered.75 Deepfake creators who
do not comply with the watermark or disclosure requirements may face
civil penalties of up to $150,000 per record in fines, five years in jail, or
both.76 The bill also allows for injunctive relief to comply creators to
use watermarks or disclosures.77 In addition to the legislation proposed
by Congress, several states, including New York, Texas, and Maine,
introduced legislation to address the harms of deepfakes.78 In October
falsely appear to a reasonable observer to be an authentic record of the
actual speech or conduct of an individual.” Id. Strikingly, the bill’s
definition of deepfake does not restrict the manner of creation to videos
created through deep learning. See id.; supra Part I.C.
71.

S. 3805, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). Law professor and commentator Orin
Kerr noted his concern that Senator Sasse’s bill reaches too far, creating
“federal crimes that prohibit acts undertaken in furtherance of any
criminal law or tort.” Orin Kerr, Should Congress Pass a “Deep Fakes”
Law?, The Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 31, 2019), http://reason.com/
volokh/2019/01/31/should-congress-pass-a-deep-fakes-law [https://perma
.cc/43DG-9WBU].

72.

S. 3805, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018).

73.

Waddell, supra note 69.

74.

H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).

75.

Id. § 2.

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Nina Iacono Brown, Congress Wants to Solve Deepfakes by 2020, Slate
(July 15, 2019, 7:30A.M.), https://slate.com/technology/2019/07/congress-
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of 2019, California passed legislation penalizing the distribution of
deepfakes of political candidates within 60 days of an election. 79
Although both federal and state level legislatures have attempted to
address the harms of deepfakes, whether these measures will comport
with the First Amendment has yet to be tested in court.
Given all of these concerns, this Note must return to our original
hypothetical. Imagine that you believe that the Donald Trump’s Pee
Tape video posted by your friend is real. Imagine that you are not the
only one. Thousands of people believe that this video is the smoking
gun that proves both that the Russians had information that could have
compromised Trump and that Russia largely controlled him throughout
the 2016 election and into his presidency. The video contains imagery
so graphic that even the Republican base turn against Trump.
Democratic activist groups are primed to believe such a video and take
to the streets, protesting in outrage. The House votes to impeach
Trump on newly discovered evidence of corruption. Republican
Senators, fearing the repercussions of not acting, ultimately decide to
remove Trump from office. Only after all of this has taken place does
video forensics reveal that the video was a deepfake. In this scenario,
could Trump recover damages from the video’s creator? What would
those damages be?

III. Defamation Law as a Remedy
For defamatory deepfakes in general, individuals or companies may
have legal remedies to protect their property or publicity under
copyright law or the tort of right to publicity.80 However, politicians
will likely struggle to recover under either of these legal theories.
Regarding copyright law, political figures often do not own much of the
video taken of them, barring them from any recovery. 81 Even if a
political figure owns the video of themselves, courts will likely not
punish an individual who uses the video to comment on the political
deepfake-regulation-230-2020.html [https://perma.cc/HT5S-HBVN]; Scott
Thistle, Maine Joins ‘Deepfake’ Flight: Might Ban in Political Ads,
Governing (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.governing.com/next/MaineJoins-Deepfake-Fight-Might-Ban-in-Political-Ads.html [https://perma.cc/
3CFY-WBM4].
79.

Colin Lecher, California has Banned Political Deepfakes During Election
Season, Verge (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/7/
20902884/california-deepfake-political-ban-election-2020 [https://perma.cc/
88Y7-4AA2].

80.

Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 34–35.

81.

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th
Cir. 1986) (noting the first element of copyright infringement is
“ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff”).

431

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment

figure in a non-commercial way, categorizing such commentary as “fair
use.” For instance, in Dhillon v. Doe,82 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California held that a non-commercial
website’s use of a politician’s headshot to criticize the politician was
“transformative” and “such a use is precisely what the Copyright Act
envisions as a paradigmatic fair use.”83 Public figures will likely also
struggle to recover under the right of publicity, or “the inherent right
of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her
identity.”84 First, only about thirty states even recognize such a right.85
Second, and even more importantly, the right to publicity only protects
the use of someone’s persona for a commercial gain.86 As in the Trump
hypothetical, many political deepfakes do not seek to profit from their
creations, so the right of publicity will not provide an appropriate legal
remedy.
This brings us to the pièce de résistance: the tort of defamation.
Defamation law covers both libel (written communications or commun–
ications that persist similarly to written works) and slander (spoken
communications).87 Although the actual elements of defamation vary
from state to state, the tort generally consists of several elements as
outlined in the Second Restatement of Torts:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the
publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.88

82.

No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 WL 722592 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014).

83.

Id. at *5.

84.

1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 3:1
(2d ed. 2018).

85.

Amanda Tate, Note, Miley Cyrus and the Attack of the Drones: The Right
of Publicity and Tabloid Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 17 Tex.
Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 73, 84 (2015).

86.

McCarthy, supra note 84.

87.

Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and
Related Problems §§ 2:4.1–.2 (4th ed. 2010).

88.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
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However, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,89 the Supreme Court
replaced the traditional third element of “fault amounting to at least
negligence” with a higher standard, requiring proof that the speech’s
publisher acted with actual malice in publishing speech directed at
public officials. 90 Actual malice is found when the statement is made
“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.”91 Mere negligence does not suffice to meet an actualmalice standard.92
The actual-malice standard creates an exceptionally high burden of
proof for public officials in defamation suits, as it is very difficult to
prove that a publisher knew the information she published was false or
that her actions regarding the information’s truthfulness rose to the
level of recklessness. The Supreme Court created such a high burden to
balance the competing interests of public officials who sought to protect
their reputations from defamation against the First Amendment’s
safeguarding of high-value political speech. The Court reasoned that
erroneous statements are “inevitable in free debate,” adding that even
erroneous statements should be protected to provide the freedom-ofexpression principle the adequate “breathing space” it needs to
survive.93 The Court held that when public officials bring a defamation
suit, any mental state on behalf of the publisher lower than actual
malice is “constitutionally deficient [in its] failure to provide the
safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” 94 Such a standard still
provides recourse for political figures because if they can prove that
individuals acted with actual malice when publishing false and defam–
atory statements about them, then the statement is not protected under
the First Amendment.95
Applying this rigorous standard to political deepfakes is relatively
straightforward. Deepfakes are intended to be “fakes” or falsehoods.
Unlike an article where an individual might not be sure about one
particular fact regarding a political figure, creators of deepfakes know
89.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

90.

Id. at 283; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (Am. Law Inst.
1977). The Court later extended the holding from Sullivan to apply not
only to public officials but also to public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967).

91.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.

92.

Id. at 287–88.

93.

Id. at 271–72.

94.

Id. at 264.

95.

See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The
freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of
speech, including defamation . . . .”).
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that the content they are creating is false. Creating a deepfake requires
a person with above-average computer literacy to download a program
and take a series of non-trivial, affirmative steps to swap someone’s face
onto another video. 96 Even as technology makes it easier to create
deepfakes, it will still be hard to prove that an individual “accidentally”
created a video of a public figure in a compromising situation. Deep–
fakes are designed to look realistic and to make others believe that the
face swapped onto the fake video is in fact the person it seems to be.
The old adage “seeing is believing” still holds as videos are generally
considered highly reliable evidence of past events.97 A deepfake creator
will not only know that what she is creating is false, but since she is
creating a video, many more persons are likely to believe that what the
video depicts is true.
Nevertheless, good-faith deepfake creators will have a rather easy
shield against culpability: any indication, either in the video itself or on
the location (webpage) where the video was posted, that the video is a
fake. If a deepfake creator supplies a watermark or disclaimer, clearly
indicating the video is a fake, such information could be used as
compelling evidence that the creator reasonably believed that others
would not treat the video as an actual representation of the political
figure. If a third party could not reasonably believe the video was a
depiction of the political figure, then the video is not defamatory.98
Given the ease of providing such a disclaimer or watermark, this will
also work against bad actors who intend to use the video to deceive. If
an individual creates a defamatory deepfake without providing any
indication that the video is fake, it seems likely that she knew or had
reckless disregard for the video’s falsity.
In addition to the actual-malice standard, politicians will also have
to establish the other elements of defamation: “a false and defamatory
statement concerning another,” “an unprivileged publication to a third
party,” and “either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”99 The
Second Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one
that “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him.”100 Some videos will be completely innocuous (e.g.,
96.

See supra Part I.B.

97.

Brundage et. al., supra note 56, at 46.

98.

See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding
that the publisher was not liable for defamation because the parody ad
“could not be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about
[respondent]”).

99.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (Am. Law Inst. 1977).

100. Id. § 559.
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a video of a politician watering her garden) and thus, not defamatory.
Bad actors, however, are likely to be more interested in using deepfake
technology to place political figures in compromising situations, aiming
to lower the reputation of those political figures. The trier of fact will
have the final word on whether the content is deemed defamatory.
Political figures seeking to recover damages will also have to prove
that the deepfake was published and that they were harmed by that
publication. A statement is published through “any act by which the
defamatory matter is . . . communicated to a third person.”101 Posting
a deepfake online would certainly constitute a publication. Finally, the
political figure could argue that the publication caused her special harm
(or some kind of monetary loss), such as the loss of an election or
reduced campaign donations.102 Even if the political figure did not suffer
a particularized harm, she could argue that the publication caused
general societal harm (such as the harms outlined in Part II).

IV. Satire or Parody as a Defense
A good-faith deepfake creator’s most readily available defense is an
acknowledgement in or near the video that the video is false. The more
obvious the disclaimer or watermark, the less likely such a video will
be misconstrued by a member of the general public that such a video
is actually real. Some political satirists, however, might not want to be
constrained by the addition of a watermark or disclaimer and instead
may claim a privilege by satire or parody. The Supreme Court noted
the importance of satire in the political-discourse context in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, stating that “[d]espite their sometimes
caustic nature . . . graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played
a prominent role in public and political debate.”103
In that case, Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine for defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress after Hustler editors
drew a cartoon in which Falwell discussed his “first time” as a “drunken
incestuous rendezvous with his mother.”104 At trial, the jury rejected
Falwell’s defamation claim based on its findings that no reasonable
person would believe that the cartoon described actual facts; however,
it found in favor of Falwell on his intentional infliction of emotion
distress claim.105 On appeal, Hustler Magazine claimed that awarding
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress violated its First
101. Id. § 577 cmt. a.
102. Ardia, supra note 10, at 9.
103. 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988).
104. Id. at 48.
105. Id. at 49.
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Amendment rights. 106 Falwell contended that the cartoon was so
“outrageous” that it was distinguishable from a traditional political
cartoon. 107 The Court, inherently suspicious of an “outrageousness”
argument, rejected Falwell’s position, noting:
“Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has
an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to
impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or
perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An
“outrageousness” standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding
refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in
question may have an adverse emotional impact on the
audience.108

The Court instead held that “public figures . . . may not recover
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of
[satirical] publications . . . without showing in addition that the
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with
‘actual malice.’”109 The Court adopted New York Times’s actual-malice
standard to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to
provide “adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment.”110
The Supreme Court’s view of outrageousness might seem like a
blank check for satirists and parody makers to use deepfakes to mock
politicians. The question remains, however, whether deepfakes can be
considered satirical works in general. The satire at issue in Hustler was
a hand-drawn caricature that the jury found could not “reasonably be
understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual
events in which [he] participated.”111 Deepfakes, unlike caricatures and
other parodies, could reasonably be understood to depict facts about an
individual. This reasonableness element is crucial for establishing
liability against a defendant asserting a parody or satire defense. In
Farah v. Esquire,112 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit noted that “satire is effective as social commentary
precisely because it is often grounded in truth.”113 Thus, “[t]he test [for
satire] . . . is not whether some actual readers were misled, but whether
106. Id. at 50.
107. Id. at 55.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 56.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 49.
112. 736 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
113. Id. at 537.
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the hypothetical reasonable reader could be (after time for
reflection).”114 What it takes to mislead the “hypothetical reasonable
reader” will certainly evolve as deepfake technology improves to mirror
true human interaction. If the video is extremely realistic, and the
actions are outrageous but within the realm of possibility, a court may
find that a deepfake intended to be a satire is actually defamatory
speech because a reasonable viewer would not be able to distinguish the
fake video from reality.

V. Injunctions as a Remedy
If a political figure can prove that a publisher acted with actual
malice to create a defamatory deepfake, and that the deepfake could
not be considered a satire, then the political figure will be able to
recover the traditional tort remedy of monetary damages.115 Despite the
attraction of monetary damages, they do nothing to stop the ongoing
reputational loss caused by the deepfake’s continued existence on the
Internet. 116 Nor do monetary damages remedy the societal damages
caused by the video if it is allowed to persist in the public sphere.
Moreover, many bad actors posting deepfakes might be judgment-proof,
denying the political figure any recovery.
Given the inadequacy of monetary damages, injunctions may be a
better avenue to address some of the harms caused by deepfakes. Unlike
monetary damages, an injunction is an equity-based remedy designed
to “order the defendant to refrain from specified conduct.”117 Political
figures are likely to favor injunctions because removing the original
video from the Internet will remedy the imminent issue of reputational
loss caused by a defamatory political deepfake. 118 Courts can grant
permanent injunctions that occur after an adjudication on the merits
of the claim, or preliminary injunctions that occur prior to adjudications
based on the likelihood of success on the merits.119 Although preliminary
injunctions may be favored because they remove an offending video
from the Internet sooner than other remedies, they face a heightened
First Amendment hurdle because they risk censoring protected

114. Id.
115. Ardia, supra note 10, at 7.
116. Id. at 16.
117. Id. at 14.
118. Id. at 9, 15–16.
119. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions
in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 149–50 (1998).
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speech. 120 Thus, this Note focuses primarily on the potential use of
permanent injunctions against defamatory political deepfakes.
A.

Injunctions and the First Amendment

The First Amendment protects individuals’ rights to freedom of
religion, speech, the press, and assembly.121 Since the founding of the
United States, courts have been keen to avoid prior restraints on speech,
or restraints on expression before occurs.122 In Near v. Minnesota,123 the
Supreme Court established that injunctions against free speech and the
press usually amount to a prior restraint on expression.124 In Near, the
Court held a state statute that perpetually enjoined individuals or
corporations (including the press) who published “a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper or other periodical” was an
unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of the press.125 The broad
nature of the statute led to the “effective censorship” of any publisher
who was convicted of publishing an “offending newspaper or
periodical,” because all future publications regarding the offending
matter (defamatory or not) would be subject to court review.126 The
Court held that the threat of enjoining the press’ constitutionally
protected activity outweighed the potential that publishing scandalous
and defamatory information may disturb the public peace.127
Similarly, the Supreme Court struck down injunctions against press
activities in both New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon
Papers) 128 and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 129 as uncon–
stitutional prior restraints on the freedom of speech and the press. In
Pentagon Papers, the Second Circuit enjoined the New York Times and
the Washington Post from publishing the “Pentagon Papers,” a Defense
Department study of American activities in Southeast Asia, after the
government argued that the information’s publication would endanger
120. See id. at 150.
121. U.S. Const. amend. I.
122. See Anthony Lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the
First Amendment 51 (1991); Ardia, supra note 10, at 32. The perception
that injunctions were prior restraints on speech and therefore invalid as
an equitable remedy was so pervasive commentators described it as the
“no injunction rule.” Id. at 18.
123. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
124. Id. at 722–23.
125. Id. at 702–03, 722–23.
126. Id. at 712.
127. Id. at 721–22.
128. (Pentagon Papers) 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
129. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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national security. 130 In Nebraska Press, a state court feared that
reporting on a sensational criminal trial in a small community would
endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial.131 The court crafted a
restrictive order prohibiting the press from reporting on certain aspects
of the trial.132 In both cases, the Supreme Court grappled with a careful
balancing test between constitutionally protected speech and important
governmental interests (national security) or individual rights (the right
to a fair trial).133 And in both cases, the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment’s free-speech guarantee outweighed either competing
interest.134
In the case of deepfakes, courts must also balance the speech
contained in defamatory political deepfakes against important
governmental interests, such as safeguarding free elections, promoting
trust in public officials, defending national security, and protecting
truth itself.135 It is important to note that in Near, Pentagon Papers,
and Nebraska Press, the balancing test involved either a statute or a
court-ordered remedy that both targeted an entire industry (the press)
and included speech that likely was not libelous.136 None of the cases
addressed an individual or private wrong of one person defaming
another. For political deepfakes, it is likely the defamatory threat would
not come from the press, but instead from a private individual
intentionally attempting to disparage a political figure. In addition,
unlike the cases discussed above, the expression in the deepfake would
be clearly false.137 Thus, if an injunction could be carefully crafted to
include only the speech in the defamatory deepfake itself, the resulting
balancing-test analysis would pit unprotected false and defamatory
speech against important governmental interests. To determine
whether a court might hold that the important (some might even say
“compelling”) governmental interests outweigh any free-speech con–
cerns, we must take a closer look at several constitutionally permissible
prior restraints on expression.

130. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.
131. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 543–45.
132. Id. at 543–44.
133. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 718; Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 543.
134. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714; Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570.
135. See supra Part II.
136. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702–03 (1931); Pentagon Papers, 403
U.S. at 714; Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570.
137. See supra Part I.
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Constitutionally Permissible Injunctions on Expression

Although prior restraints on expression bear “a heavy presumption
against [their] constitutional validity,” not all prior restraints are pro–
hibited by the Constitution.138 In Near, the Supreme Court outlined
four exceptions to the prior-restraint rule: (1) key issues of national
security, such as troop movements or sailing dates; (2) obscene
publications; (3) incitement to acts of violence or attempts to overthrow
the government; and (4) to “protect private rights” in accordance with
the rules of courts of equity.” 139 Other than the national-security
exception, all the exceptions outlined in Near relate to speech that falls
outside of the First Amendment’s traditional protective scope.140
1.

Obscenity

Obscenity has no protection under the First Amendment.141 In Roth
v. United States, the Court held that “obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press.”142 The Court reasoned
that “lewd and obscene . . . utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.”143 Since obscenity provides
such low social value, the Court in Miller v. California144 affirmed a
broader test to determine what constitutes obscenity. A trier of fact
must determine whether (1) “‘the average person, applying contemp–
orary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest”;145 (2) the work depicts offensive sexual
conduct; and (3) “the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.”146
Given that obscenity receives no constitutional protection, states
have some ability to censor lewd and obscene publications as long as
they take precautions to avoid censoring protected speech. In Times

138. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
139. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
140. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555, 559
(1985); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
141. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)).
144. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
145. Id. at 16 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
146. Id.
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Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,147 the Supreme Court upheld a local
ordinance requiring filmmakers to submit their films to a review board
and obtain approval from the city prior to a public exhibition.148 The
Court clarified this holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 149 where it
affirmed that states could use noncriminal processes, including prior
submission, to censor obscenity in films. 150 However, the prior
submission must “take[] place under procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.”151
2.

Copyright

A copyright holder has “the right to exclude others from using his
property.”152 Individuals cannot copyright facts or ideas, but they can
copyright a particular “expression.”153 Although copyright law creates
a restriction on speech, the Supreme Court held in Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises154 that the First Amendment does
not protect speech that infringes on another’s copyright.155 Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, a federal court “may . . . grant temporary and
final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent
or restrain infringement of a copyright.”156 Under this statute, modern
courts have been willing to grant not only permanent injunctions but
also preliminary injunctions to protect a plaintiff’s property interests.157
The practice of granting injunctions in copyright and patent cases
became so pervasive that in 2006 the Supreme Court reminded lower
courts that in granting injunctions, they should not abandon
“traditional equitable considerations.”158 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., the Supreme Court noted that it has “consistently rejected
invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule
that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a

147. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
148. Id. at 46.
149. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
150. Id. at 58.
151. Id.
152. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (quoting
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
153. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 166.
154. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
155. Id. at 555–60; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 150, 166.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012).
157. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 150, 158–59.
158. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
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copyright has been infringed.”159 Under eBay, a copyright- or patentholding plaintiff must satisfy a four-factor test before a permanent
injunction can be granted to protect her intellectual property interest.160
The four factors are: (1) the plaintiff “has suffered an irreparable
injury”; (2) “remedies available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate
for [the] injury”; (3) “considering the balance of hardships between [the
parties], a remedy in equity is warranted”; and (4) “the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”161 Although eBay
was a patent case, lower courts have extended its holding to copyright
cases involving preliminary- or permanent-injunction requests.162
C.

Injunctions on Defamatory Speech

Like obscenity and copyrights, defamatory speech has only limited
protection under the First Amendment. 163 Unlike obscenity and
copyrights, however, courts have been hesitant to allow injunctions on
defamatory speech.164 The Supreme Court did not formally address the
issue of injunctions against non-press related defamation until 2005.165
In Tory v. Cochran, 166 the Court accepted a case on post-trial
injunctions against defamatory speech, but Cochran’s untimely death
prevented a final resolution of the issue.167 The Tory case arose out of
a dispute between renowned attorney Johnnie Cochran and Ulysses
Tory, a disgruntled prior client of Cochran’s law firm.168 Dissatisfied
with Cochran’s services, Tory picketed outside Cochran’s office with
159. Id. at 392–93.
160. Id. at 391.
161. Id.
162. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2nd Cir. 2010) (holding that “eBay
applies with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued
for alleged copyright infringement”); Peter Lettersese & Assocs. v. World
Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1323 (citing eBay’s four-factor
test as the appropriate criteria to evaluate a permanent injunction in a
copyright case); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532,
543 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying eBay’s four-factor test to analyze a
permanent injunction in a copyright case); see also Anthony DiSarro,
Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substantive
Principles of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 51, 83 (2013).
163. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002).
164. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 149–50.
165. See generally Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 737–38; Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunction in Defamation Cases, 57
Syracuse L. Rev. 157, 162 (2007). Chemerinsky served as Tory’s counsel
in Tory. 544 U.S. at 735.
168. Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 158.

442

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment

other discontented clients.169 Cochran sued Tory and the picketers for
defamation. After Tory indicated that he would “continue to engage in
[the defamatory] activity in the absence of a court order,” the California
Superior Court issued an injunction prohibiting Tory from “orally
uttering statements” about Cochran and his law firm in “any public
forum.” 170 Tory challenged the injunction, alleging that it was an
unconstitutional prior restraint on his free-speech rights. 171 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the specific question of “[w]hether
a permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation action, preventing
all future speech about an admitted public figure, violates the First
Amendment.”172
The case took an unexpected turn when Cochran died one week
after oral argument.173 Because the injunction against Tory was still in
effect after Cochran’s death, the Court held the case was not moot.174
However, the Court held that the injunction had lost its underlying
rationale of preventing Tory from coercing Cochran to “pay a ‘tribute’”
for Tory to desist in the defamatory activity.175 The Court adopted a
very narrow holding: “the injunction, as written, now amounts to an
overly broad prior restraint upon speech, lacking plausible
justification.”176 Although the Court defined the current injunction as a
prior restraint on speech, it left the door open for injunctions against
defamatory speech in the future: “If . . . injunctive relief may still be
warranted, any appropriate party remains free to ask for such relief.
We express no view on the constitutional validity of any such new relief,
tailored to these changed circumstances, should it be entered.”177
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of the
constitutionally of injunctions against defamatory speech, lower courts
have begun to experiment with injunctions in the new age of Internet
defamation.178 According to a survey by David Ardia of more than 242
decisions involving injunctions against defamatory speech, “at least
fifty-six decisions . . . granted or affirmed [the] injunctions,” with a

169. Id. at 159.
170. Tory, 544 U.S. at 735–36.
171. Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 161.
172. Tory, 544 U.S. at 735–36; Chemerinsky, supra note 167.
173. Tory, 544 U.S. at 736.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 736–38.
176. Id. at 738.
177. Id. at 738–39.
178. Ardia, supra note 10, at 4.
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stark increase in the number of courts granting injunctions after 2000.179
Both federal180 and state181 courts have permitted injunctions against
defamatory speech, although courts vary widely in defining the
appropriate scope of those injunctions.182 Courts tend to rely on three
primary justifications when granting permanent injunctions against
defamatory speech: “(1) the speech impugned the plaintiff’s property
interest; (2) the defendant engaged in a continuing course of conduct
that caused the plaintiff harm; or (3) the speech had been adjudged to
be defamatory.” 183 The most common reason cited for upholding
injunctions against speech is that such speech had already been
adjudged to be defamatory, therefore an injunction against it would not
be a prior restraint on protected speech.184
Federal courts are split on the issue of injunctions against defam–
atory speech. Although some circuits have taken the traditional view
that “equity does not enjoin a libel or slander,”185 the Fifth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits have permitted at least limited injunctions against
defamatory or fraudulent speech.186 Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
permitted injunctions against defamatory speech only if the injunctions
179. Id. at 42.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 186–190 (highlighting that, although
federal courts are split, some courts such as the Sixth Circuit issue limited
injunctions for defamatory speech).
181. Ohio, Georgia, Minnesota, California, Kentucky, and Montana have
adopted rules allowing injunctions on speech that courts deem
defamatory. See Ardia, supra note 10, at 48–50; O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty.
Tenants Union, 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975); Retail Credit Co. v.
Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62 (Ga. 1975); Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v.
Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984); Balboa Island Vill.
Inn v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 348–49 (Cal. 2007); Hill v. Petrotech Res.
Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Ky. 2010); St. James Healthcare v. Cole, 178
P.3d 696, 703 (Mont. 2008) (adding that not every injunction that
amounts to a prior restraint is “impermissible”).
182. Ardia, supra note 10, at 52–57 (outlining four types of injunctions utilized
by various federal and state courts).
183. Id. at 43–44.
184. Id. at 48.
185. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (quoting Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 108 F.Supp. 508, 510–11
(D.D.C. 1961)); Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest.
Emps. Int’l Union, 239 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2001).
186. See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125
F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding an injunction against
fraudulent and defamatory signs held by union members during a labor
dispute); Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir. 1992);
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208–09 (6th Cir. 1990)
(Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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were limited to speech that had been previously adjudged to be
defamatory. 187 In Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, Carpenter, a company
owner who had previously been involved in administrative and judicial
proceedings with two attorneys, wrote and sent defamatory letters
about the attorneys to the President of the attorneys’ workplace.188 The
attorneys sued Carpenter for defamation and sought a permanent
injunction preventing Carpenter from publishing further defamatory
statements. 189 Through dual concurring opinions, the Sixth Circuit
granted a limited injunction emphasizing that because Carpenter’s
defamatory statements were “frequent and continu[ous],” an injunction
was an appropriate remedy to “prevent future injury to [the attorneys’]
personal reputation[s].”190
Other circuit courts have not directly addressed the issue of
whether any injunction against defamatory speech constitutes an
unconstitutional prior restraint; but they have rejected proposed
injunctions on the basis that they were overbroad.191 The First Circuit
recently took this approach in Sindi v. El-Moslimany.192 There, the First
Circuit struck down an injunction prohibiting an individual from
“publishing ‘orally, in writing, through direct electronic commun–
ications, or by directing others to website or blogs reprinting’ six
statements that the district court concluded were defamatory.”193 The
trial court granted a permanent injunction against a woman engaged in
an online campaign to smear and defame a scientist whom she believed
was engaged in an affair with her husband. 194 The circuit court
effectively applied a strict-scrutiny test to the injunction.195 Since the
trial court’s injunction was not “as narrowly tailored as possible to

187. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d at 51 (ordering the district court to “narrow its
previous language so as to enjoin the dissemination of information relating
to . . . the subject of the underlying suit”); Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d at 1208–
09 (Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (limiting the
injunction “to the statements which have been found in this and in prior
proceedings to be false and libelous”).
188. Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d at 1203.
189. Id. at 1203–04.
190. Id. at 1208–09 (Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. See Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 34 (1st Cir. 2018); McCarthy v.
Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 461–62 (7th Cir. 2015).
192. Sindi, 896 F.3d 1, at 27–36.
193. Id. at 12, 34.
194. Id. at 11–12.
195. Id. at 30, 37 n.16.
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avoid censoring protected speech,” the circuit court held that it
amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint.196
In dissent, Judge Barron argued against the “application of strict
scrutiny.” 197 Barron relied on Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of
Western New York 198 and Madsen v. Women’s Health Center 199 to
assert that the Supreme Court has upheld injunctions against speech as
a prophylactic measure when the enjoined parties were likely to
continue to engage in the unprotected conduct.200 Barron argued that
the appropriate standard of review for injunctions against defamatory
speech should be one that “burden[s] no more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest,”201 not that the injunction is
“the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.”202
Thus, courts have left open two key questions: (1) whether all
injunctions against defamatory speech constitute unconstitutional prior
restraints; and (2) if some injunctions are permissible, what is the
appropriate scope of injunctions against defamatory speech so that the
injunctions comport with the First Amendment. In an effort to explore
whether some injunctions may be permissible under the First
Amendment, David Ardia sorted injunctions against defamatory speech
into four types based on their restrictiveness. 203 Type I injunctions
“prohibit[] a party from making any statements about the plaintiff.”204
These injunctions are extremely broad and highly unlikely to pass a
First Amendment challenge. Type II injunctions “prohibit a party from
publishing any defamatory statements about the plaintiff.”205 Type II
injunctions are also likely to be overbroad because “they are not precise
enough to put the defendant on notice as to what speech will violate
the injunction.”206 Although both Type I and Type II injunctions target
individuals who have engaged in defamatory conduct in the past, they
overreach and effectively deprive the defendants of the “breathing

196. Id. at 35.
197. Id. at 45.
198. 519 U.S. 357, 381–82 (1997).
199. 512 U.S. 753, 768–71 (1994).
200. Sindi, 896 F.3d at 45–46.
201. Id. at 45 (quoting Schenck, 519 U.S. at 372).
202. Id. (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478).
203. Ardia, supra note 10, at 52.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 53.
206. Id.
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space” necessary to engage in public debate.207 Such restrictions amount
to unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.
Type III injunctions “prohibit a party from publishing certain
enumerated statements about the plaintiff without limiting the
injunction to the specific statements that have been found to be
defamatory.” 208 Type III injunctions are probably the closest to the
injunction granted by the trial court in Sindi.209 Type III injunctions
are attractive to plaintiffs who have been defamed by spoken words or
written commentaries because the injunctions are flexible enough to
capture potential defamatory speech that has not yet been published.
But some courts may consider Type III injunctions unconstitutional
prior restraints because they cover speech that has not yet been
adjudged defamatory. In addition, Type III injunctions are not be the
least-restrictive remedy in most cases, so they are not likely to survive
a strict-scrutiny analysis. However, some courts have been willing to
permit such injunctions if the defendant’s defamatory conduct is either
ongoing or coercive.210 In cases where the defendant admits that she
plans to continue engaging in defamatory conduct, a court may find
that preventing harassment serves as a sufficiently important interest
to permit an injunction.211 If, however, a specific defamatory work could
be targeted with precision, Type III injunctions may be overly broad.
Thus, we are left with Type IV injunctions, which “only prohibit[]
further publication, or orders the removal of the specific statements a
court or jury has found are defamatory.”212 Type IV injunctions are the
narrowest possible injunctive remedy; thus, if a plaintiff can articulate
a compelling interest for the injunction, it may even clear strict
scrutiny’s high hurdle. But Type IV injunctions are exceedingly difficult
to apply against spoken words or specific passages of written
commentary because defamatory comments made in this manner are
often very contextual.213 Type IV injunctions are more easily applied in
cases where a video or a complete work is posted on the Internet. The
207. N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964).
208. Ardia, supra note 10, at 54.
209. Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2018) (enjoining the
publication, through oral and written means, electronic communications,
or direction to publications, of six statements it held to be defamatory).
210. Id. at 44–45 (Barron, J., dissenting); Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d
1200, 1208–09 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
211. Sindi, 896 F.3d at 44 (Barron, J., dissenting); Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d at
1208–09 (Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. Ardia, supra note 10, at 56.
213. Sindi, 896 F.3d at 30 (noting the injunction cannot stand “principally
because of its failure to account for contextual variation”).
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injunction can be tailored to that specific work in an almost surgical
fashion, removing only the files or words deemed unprotected while
leaving intact the remaining protected speech. In many ways, these very
limited injunctions against defamatory speech can work in the same
way as injunctions against obscenity by targeting a specific expressive
work. In dicta, the First Circuit mused on this distinction, noting that
the “obscenity doctrine proscribes specific expressive works (such as
books or movies) that . . . lack ‘serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value,’” while “injunction[s] that prevent[] in perpetuity the
utterance of particular words and phrases after a defamation trial is
quite a different matter.”214
Thus, courts have not developed a consensus on how to address
injunctions against defamatory speech. Even so, examples of permissible
injunctions in obscenity and copyright cases, as well as Ardia’s
framework for injunctions against defamatory speech, can serve as a
basis for determining whether injunctions against defamatory political
deepfakes might survive a First Amendment challenge.

VI. Injunctions on Defamatory Deepfakes
Deepfakes are strikingly different from many other forms of
defamatory speech in both the manner they are created and in their
form of expression. First, unlike other defamatory speech, all of a
deepfake’s content is inherently false, so there is a higher presumption
of a culpable mental state on the part of the deepfake creator. Second,
deepfakes have little social value because they are inherently false and
they undermine the public’s ability to distinguish what is true from
what is false. Finally, it is easier to enjoin the expressive form of
deepfakes, as opposed to enjoining their underlying ideas, because
deepfake creators need the assistance of artificial intelligence to
generate deepfakes.
In most defamatory speech cases involving spoken or written words,
it is highly unlikely that all of the expression is untrue. This is exactly
the case, however, with deepfakes: every frame is a falsehood. As
defined above, deepfakes “alter the content of an original video, image,
and/or audio file by face swapping or scenario alterations.”215 Unlike
with spoken or written words, when a court enjoins a deepfake, it
eliminates the possibility that the content could be republished in the
same form (video, photo, or audio) in a true manner. Even if the
publisher changes a few frames in the deepfake, the remainder would
still be false. At best, reproducing a deepfake without some offending
frames still creates false, but non-defamatory, content. In United States
214. Id. at 33.
215. See supra Part I.C.
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v. Alvarez, 216 the Supreme Court upheld some First Amendment
protections even for false speech.217 Still, the value of protecting false
speech is not sufficient to outweigh important or compelling
governmental interests, such as free and fair elections or national
security.
In addition, a deepfake creator intentionally alters every frame of a
video to intentionally distort reality. Such a calculated act creates a
much stronger presumption that a deepfake creator has a culpable
mental state as compared to a publisher of an angry social-media post
who slips in an untrue detail about another person. Blog-post creators
may credibly deny that they knew a specific detail of their blog was
false when it was published; but deepfake creators will have a much
more difficult time convincing a fact-finder that they were unaware they
were creating and publishing a deepfake. Thus, the way deepfakes are
created brings deepfake cases in line with copyright or obscenity cases
in that there is more evidence that the infringing material was created
by someone with a guilty mental state. In copyright cases, it is
exceedingly difficult for a copier to convince a fact-finder that she
coincidentally replicated another author’s work word for word.
Similarly, in obscenity cases, it is unlikely that a jury would find that
a pornographic video’s publisher was unaware that a group-sex video
she published would be considered porn. Indeed, given the current
technological skills needed for deepfake creation, it might be harder for
plaintiffs to prove a culpable mental state in many copyright and
obscenity cases than it would be in a deepfake case.
Second, defamatory deepfakes, similar to obscenity, have little
social value. There are some positive uses for non-defamatory deepfakes,
such as artistic expression or satire,218 but the underlying content of a
defamatory deepfake will always be (at minimum) a recklessly created
falsehood. Combining the deepfake’s ability to spread falsehoods with
the video medium’s generally perceived truthfulness undermines the
public’s ability to believe its own eyes. Although our society can tolerate
some protections for falsehoods, once a deepfake crosses the line into
defamation it is stripped of all social value. Defamatory deepfakes do
not contribute to public discourse; instead they distort open-forum
principles by undermining the concept of truth itself. Similar to

216. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
217. See id. at 719–720 (overturning the Stolen Valor Act, which made it a
crime to falsely claim receipt of a military decoration, on the ground that
“falsity alone” is not enough to bring speech outside the First
Amendment).
218. See supra Part IV (explaining how satire or parody can be a good-faith
defense against deepfake accusations).
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obscenity, any benefit derived from defamatory deepfakes “is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”219
Third, and similar to copyright, it is easier to enjoin a deepfake as
a “form of expression” than it would be for most other forms of
defamatory speech.220 Deepfakes, by definition, must be created “with
the use of deep learning.” 221 Deepfakes create a specific type of
electronic file (either video, photo, or audio), and a court has the ability
to make the distinction between enjoining the specific form of
expression (i.e., content created with the aid of artificial intelligence)
and enjoining the underlying ideas or speech in the video. Although it
might seem that enjoining only the form of expression does not go far
enough to protect political figures from defamatory speech, such an
argument is unavailing. The novel threat of deepfakes is that the
manner in which they are created—and the manner in which they are
viewed—makes them more likely to be perceived as real. For “seeing is
believing,” and realistic-looking videos are generally more likely to be
believed than written commentaries. 222 Thus, enjoining the form of
expression, as opposed to the underlying speech, at worst returns
political figures to the status quo.

VII. Appropriate Scope for Injunctions Against
Political Defamatory Deepfakes
Although defamation may be the appropriate legal theory by which
political figures should address deepfakes in a court of law, obscenity
and copyright law provide the appropriate remedies. Similar to the
obscenity test defined in Miller, the standard to determine whether a
deepfake is defamatory should be: if “the average person, applying
contemporary community standards would find the work, taken as a
whole” to be defamatory and “lack[ing] serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value,”223 then the deepfake is defamatory. If the
entire work is not considered as a whole, a deepfake creator could
change just one frame in the offending video and repost it to the
Internet in its entirety. Once the “work as a whole” has been adjudged

219. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)). But see Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (explaining that the “First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters”).
220. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 167.
221. See supra Part I.C.
222. Brundage et al., supra note 56, at 46.
223. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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defamatory, then the court can craft a narrow injunction related to the
specific deepfake.
Erwin Chemerinsky, who served as counsel for Ulysses Tory at the
Supreme Court, argued against injunctions of defamatory speech: “Any
effective injunction will be overbroad and any limited injunction will be
ineffective.”224 Given the properties of a deepfake, it is possible to craft
an injunction that is both narrowly tailored and effective. For instance,
in copyright cases, courts have the original work to compare against
the potentially infringing content. Courts can specifically identify
whether a particular expression sufficiently mimics that of the
copyrighted work.225 Similarly, with deepfakes, courts can use certain
technology to see whether republications of a defamatory deepfake are
the same as the original video that it already deemed defamatory.226
Even if courts choose to follow the current legal framework of
injunctions under defamation law, very narrowly tailored injunctions—
such as the Type IV injunctions outline in Part V.C.—would likely be
effective at removing offending material without disturbing protected
speech. A court could craft an injunction such as the one below:
Defendants are permanently enjoined from publishing the
deepfake, (describe deepfake file name here), adjudged
defamatory by this court, either in its entirety or in part on any
public medium (including, but not limited to, the Internet,
television, and/or radio). Publication in part shall include the
publication of any frame, series of frames, and/or audio snippet(s)
from (describe deepfake file name here).

Such an injunction is broad enough to prevent further harm from
the specific deepfake, while still being narrow enough to avoid censoring
constitutionally protected speech. Given deepfakes’ special
characteristics and risks, they serve as a unique example that some
injunctions on defamatory speech may comport with the First
Amendment.

VIII. Injunctions and Third-Party Providers
Even if an injunction against a deepfake is found to be
constitutional, under the current statutory scheme only the creator can
be held liable for not removing the offending content from the

224. Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 171.
225. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 159–61.
226. Will Knight, The Defense Department has Produced the First Tools
for Catching Deepfakes, Tech. Rev. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.
technologyreview.com/s/611726/the-defense-department-has-produced-thefirst-tools-for-catching-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/P6GQ-EEDU].
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Internet.227 Under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 (“CDA”),228 Internet service providers (“ISPs”) are not subject to
civil liability for the content posted to their webpages by a third
party.229 Congress adopted the CDA wake of the Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy Services,230 where the Supreme Court of New York held that
an interactive ISP that monitored its services should be considered a
publisher of defamatory content, even though a third party posted the
content on the ISP’s webpage.231 Congress feared that exposing ISPs to
civil liability would discourage self-censorship. Thus, Congress provided
immunity from civil liability to ISPs for content posted by third parties,
even if the ISP monitors or modifies the content. 232 Courts have
interpreted the CDA broadly, insulating “interactive computer
services” from all civil liability (except copyright infringement) for
content posted on their websites.233
The blanket immunity provided to ISPs by CDA § 230 could pose
a major issue for defamatory political deepfakes because many deepfake
creators will likely be unreachable by the judicial system. Crafty
deepfake creators may post their creations under fake usernames and
leave an insufficient digital trail to be identified and brought to court.
Also, a multitude of deepfake creators may reside outside the physical
jurisdiction of the United States. 234 Many legal commentators have
addressed the issues of ISP immunity under the CDA § 230. 235

227. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
228. Id. § 230.
229. Id.
230. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1985).
231. Id. at *4–5.
232. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1602 (2018).
233. Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability
Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent L.J. 295, 295
(2002).
234. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 44. Some individuals may have even
been directed by a foreign state to meddle in American politics. Id.
235. See generally Danielle Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (2014)
(discussing the effects of cyber harassment and necessary legal reforms,
including addressing CDA-created immunity); Danielle Keats Citron &
Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans
Section 230 Immunity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (2017); Joseph G.
Marano, Note, Caught in the Web: Enjoining Defamatory Speech that
Appears on the Internet, 69 Hastings L.J. 1311 (2018) (arguing that
“the overbroad immunity courts have read into section 230 of the CDA,
necessitate[s] a remedy”).
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Deepfakes are merely another addition to a growing list of concerns
created by blanket immunity to ISPs.236
Because deepfakes create unique issues and threats, Congress
should create an exception for them, similar to exception created for
copyright infringements under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”).237 The DCMA provides ISPs with a “safe harbor” to limit
ISPs’ liability for monetary damages for copyrighted materials hosted
on their websites.238 ISPs can, however, be held in contempt for failing
to comply with an injunction if they do not comply with several general
requirements.239 ISPs “must adopt, implement, and inform users of a
policy providing for the termination of repeat infringers.”240 In addition,
ISPs must employ “standard technical measures” to detect copyrighted
works.241 Most importantly for copyright holders, to be eligible for the
“safe-harbor” protections, ISPs must, “upon notification of claimed
infringement . . . respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity.”242 This provision is often referred to as “notice and
takedown” procedure.243
Extending the protections of the DMCA to cover defamatory
deepfakes would significantly reduce their potential harm. Even if a
political figure was unable to find the deepfake’s original creator, she
could bring a defamation case against the unnamed creator. If political
figure could prove that the video is a deepfake, and the court finds the
video to be defamatory, the political figure could obtain a default
judgment, including a permanent injunction (like the one described in
Part VII). The political figure could then send a takedown notice to the
ISP, backed by the full weight of judicial authority.
Although such a process allows the defamatory video to be posted
longer than any political figure would like, the process provides a
multitude of other protections. First, many ISPs actively self-police,
and upon notice that a political figure has filed a high-profile lawsuit
alleging a video to be a deepfake, they would likely take down the video
prior to any court proceedings either out of a sense of corporate
236. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 38–39.
237. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); Band & Schruers, supra note 233.
238. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2012); Band & Schruers, supra note 233, at 304.
239. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (2012); Band & Schruers, supra note 233, at 304.
240. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2012); Band & Schruers, supra note 233, at 304.
241. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2012); Band & Schruers, supra note 233, at 304.
242. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2012); Band & Schruers, supra note 233, at
305.
243. Jennifer M. Urban, Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analysis, 64
J. Copyright Soc’y 483, 486 (2017).
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responsibility or for economic reasons.244 Even if the ISP does not selfpolice, and the video is allowed to remain on the Internet throughout
the duration of the suit, simply giving political figures the ability to sue
allows them to signal that they are contesting the validity of a posted
video. The political figures can then publicize their lawsuit, and an
attentive press would likely report on that lawsuit. The political figure’s
lawsuit has the secondary effect of warning the press to proceed with
caution on their reporting of the video’s contents.
Certainly, the DMCA process is not perfect,245 but it is the only
time-tested process for dealing with individually policing and removing
non-protected speech posted on the Internet. Due to ISPs’ familiarity
with the DMCA, extending it to deepfakes should create only minimal
additional costs for ISPs. Although deepfakes will become progressively
easier to create, they will likely never be as pervasive as copyright
infringement. Also because, at least for the time being, creating a
deepfake leaves a digital trace, deepfakes should be easier for ISPs to
detect than copyright infringements.246 Given the minimal additional
cost on ISPs, extending the DMCA to defamatory deepfakes would be
a cost effective way to deal with the serious threats they pose to society.

Conclusion
It is clear that defamatory political deepfakes could cause serious
harms to individuals and society. Such harms, however, must be
balanced against protecting freedom of speech under the First
Amendment. Courts have rightfully been skeptical of restraints on
expression, especially if they have the possibility of restricting protected
speech. But in the case of deepfakes, courts have an opportunity to
specifically define the form of expression that is defamatory. Courts also
bear a far lower risk of misclassifying speech as defamatory because
deepfakes are purposefully designed to be false. Thus, courts should
draw lessons from both obscenity and copyright law to allow some
narrowly crafted permanent injunctions against deepfakes. Such
narrowly crafted injunctions will help prevent the spread of
misinformation that might undermine elections or trust in public
officials while providing the least restrictive means possible of limiting
244. See Klonick, supra note 232, at 1625–30.
245. See generally Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences:
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 487 (2005); Methaya Sirichit, Catching the Conscience: An
Analysis of the Knowledge Theory Under § 512(C)’s Safe Harbor & the
Role of Willful Blindness in the Finding of Red Flags, 23 Alb. L.J. Sci.
& Tech. 85 (2013); Thomas A. Mitchell, Note, Copyright, Congress, and
Constitutionality: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Goes Too
Far, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2115 (2004); Urban, supra note 243, at
486.
246. Knight, supra note 226.

454

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment

expression. In addition, Congress should consider expanding the DMCA
or other similar legislation to include defamatory deepfakes. Only
through such action will political figures (and society, in general) have
a legitimate judicial solution to the harms created by defamatory
political deepfakes.
Returning to this Note’s original hypothetical, if Trump had an
opportunity to counter the defamatory deepfake through a judicial
process that provided him with an equitable remedy to remove the
offending content, then some of the video’s potential harms would be
at least curbed, if not eliminated. Instead of simply denying the video’s
truth, using the judicial process to counter and remove such content
would bring more legitimacy to deepfake target’s denial, and
consequently, to the political system in general. Such a hypothetical
could happen to any political figure at any governmental level. As a
society, regardless of our individual political beliefs, we need a more
legitimate system for combating this kind of misinformation, especially
when it comes in such a virulent form as a deepfake video. The judicial
system, drawing on lessons learned regarding other types of limited
protected speech, could provide this solution.
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